ated in the Miller study. For example, he reports that in 374 of 448 industries (83 perc the largest four firms had greater value added per employee than did the "rest of the indu try". (The "rest of the industry" had the greater value added per employee in 48, or 11 per cent, of the cases.) No serious student of economies of scale would find this result surprisin implying as it does merely that there are some economies of scale in most industries and th the largest four firms in most industries are, on the average, not so large as to encounter ous diseconomies of scale.2 But Miller's approach leaves the impression (he does not sta explicitly) that the largest four firms nearly always have higher labor productivity than al the other firms in the industry, and that firms have to be at least as large as the "Big Fou order to be optimally efficient. Of course, the fact that the "Big Four" have higher labor p ductivity than the average for the "rest of the industry" does not necessarily imply that t have higher labor productivity than the firms ranked 5th through 8th in size, or for that m ter, firms even smaller. The really important empirical problems with respect to economies of scale, laden with policy implications, are to estimate minimum optimal firm size, its rel tionship to the size of the market, and the resultant minimum level of market concentrati consistent with efficiency. Despite the title of his article, Miller provides little evidenc these questions and on the "extent of economies of scale" within individual industries.
The foregoing suggests that it might be worthwhile to compare the labor productivity the largest four firms with that of the "next four largest firms", rather than with the "rest the industry". Since it seems not to matter greatly which measure of labor productivit employed, the ratio of value added per employee (four largest firms) to value added per em ployee (next four largest firms) has been calculated for each of 444 Census manufactur industries for which the requisite data were available for 1972. The size distribution of thes ratios appears in Table I.3 Those who choose to interpret labor productivity data as evidence of economies of scale will still find support in Table I for the proposition that economies of scale frequently exte out to the size of the largest four firms. The largest four firms have the higher labor prod tivity in 282 out of 444 cases (64 percent). Still, the superiority of the largest four firms a pears to be much less pervasive than Miller's comparison suggested. And if these 282 imply economies of scale, then presumably there are 150 industries (34 percent of the total in which diseconomies of scale exist. In 57 of these industries (13 percent of the total samp the "next four largest firms" have a labor productivity advantage of more than 25 per over the largest four firms.
While the incidence of cases in which the largest four firms have the advantage greatly reduced by this approach as compared to Miller's, so too is the average magnitude of the advantage. The median ratio for the entire 444 industry sample is only 1.10, and the ge metric mean is 1.12. These figures imply an "average" advantage for the largest four f far less than the 37 percent reported by Miller, 4 and are of an order of magnitude which o 2. As for the "average" 37 percent large-firm advantage, this may be highly misleading, as noted below. 3. The seemingly odd size class limits serve the interest of symmetry. While a ratio of 1.50 implies a 50 per greater labor productivity by the four largest firms, a ratio of 0.67 implies approximately a 50 percent greater productivity by the next four largest firms compared to the four largest.
4. While it is not entirely clear, it appears that the average 37 percent advantage in value added per emplo (and other similar figures reported by Miller) was obtained by calculating a simple average of the ratios of va added per employee (largest four firms) to value added per employee (rest of industry). If so, a faulty procedur been used. Suppose, for example, that in half of the industries in the sample the largest four firms have twic labor productivity of the rest of the industry (ratio of 2.0), while in the other half, the rest of the industry has tw the labor productivity of the largest four firms (ratio of 0.50). The simple arithmetic mean of the ratios wou ers have suggested might easily be explained away by fac
While there may in fact be many individual industrie scale extend out to the size of the largest firms (in Table   the calculated "relative labor productivity ratio" excee appear also to be many industries (albeit fewer) in whi the overall picture is not nearly as one-sided as that p
One further point is worthy of mention before clo productivity differences reflect economies of scale, and e substantially higher labor productivity than the next four that a firm needs to be anywhere near as large as the lar mally efficient. This is because there often is a consid "Big Four" and the "Next Four" firms. For example, i 2043), the largest four firms had a 47 percent higher val
Four" in 1972. But in terms of value of shipments, th 1 .25, but surely it would be inappr6priate to conclude that, "on averag value added per employee. With this kind of data, the geometric mea its value would be 1.00.
5. See Caves, Khalilizadeh-Shirazi, and Porter [4] . It should be noted that this study, while employing same kind of measure as did Miller's, was concerned with estimating the importance of scale economies at the p level, and did not use precisely the same measure as discussed in this paper.
was eleven times as large as the average member of the "Next Four". Conceivably, being merely five times as large might have sufficed to take advantage of all economies of scale.6
III. The Soundness of the Scale Economies Interpretation
Given the various alternative explanations for differences in labor productivity, it is a mystery why anyone would seize upon scale economies as the explanation. Firms of different sizes in the same Census industry may differ with respect to labor productivity (as measured by value added per employee) for many reasons. They may differ in capital intensity, the quality of their labor inputs, the extent of monopsony power, the extent to which they utilize purchased services, such as advertising and telephone, the geographical market they serve, the extent to which they enjoy product differentiation advantages, and the product or product mixes which they are engaged in producing. Miller attempted to deal with several of these factors, although not in an entirely convincing manner, but other possible explanations were all but ignored.
One factor which would seem to merit more consideration that it has received are differences in product or product mix. While Miller writes of the "fine level of detail" characterizing the four-digit Census industries [5, 470] , there appears to be a consensus that, more often than not, the four digit Census industry definitions are excessively broad and encompass non-competing and essentially different products [2, 132; 8, 57; 11, 199] . To take just one among numerous ready examples, one must wonder how meaningful it is to assert that the four largest producers in SIC 3711 ( One problem with applying this test is that the data on value added per employee are quite volatile from one Census year to another. The four largest firms may appear to have a 6 . It must be recognized, on the other hand, that in some cases there may be only one or even no firms of minimum optimal scale in the industry. Unfortunately, the data exist only for groups of four or more firms.
7. Imported automobiles are, of course, not counted in the Census figures, and there were only four significant domestic producers of automobiles in 1972. 8 . Examples of the use of the survivor technique to estimate economies of scale include the studies of Stigler [12] , Saving [7] , Weiss [15] , and Shepherd [10] . To get around the problem of data volatility, all industries were identified for which th "relative labor productivity ratio" exceeded 1.25 in both 1967 and 1972, and the change the value of shipments four-firm concentration ratios between 1967 and 1972 were compute for these industries. Since very small changes in concentration ratios typically mean little b cause of the effects of random elements and/or rounding errors, it is appropriate to focus non-trivial changes, and this philosophy is reflected in Table III , which shows the frequency distribution of concentration changes for the 67 industries for which the relative labor pro ductivity ratio exceeded 1.25 in both 1967 and 1972. In Table III not behave much differently with respect to co whole. While other factors may also be at work mean 1967 four-firm concentration ratio for the 6 mean ratio for the sample as a whole (46.8 to 38.4), further increases in concentration, and an examina factor has little effect on the validity of the comp Perhaps a 25 percent labor productivity advantag cant economies of scale, given the other possible ex should be noted that the number of cases of "sig rapidly as one raises the criterion ratio. In Table   of those for the sample as a whole, and are inconsis although they are perfectly consistent with some of ing the possibility that firms of different sizes are mixes.
IV. Concluding Remarks
The extent of economies of scale is an empirical question with tremendous implications for the making of public policy. Unfortunately, no method of estimation has yet been developed that is both reasonably reliable and easy in its application over a wide range of industry. As the arguments and results of this paper make clear, Miller's "scale-economies" interpretation of labor productivity data is open to serious question. When it comes to estimating economies of scale at the firm level, there at present appears to be no acceptable substitute for the laborious procedures of Bain [1] , Pratten [6] , and Scherer et al. [9] , who have produced such
estimates for a relatively small number of manufacturing industries in the U.S., Great Britain, and elsewhere. Given the complexity of the scale economies estimation problem, no po-tential source of information should be ignored, but at the same time, simplistic interpretations must be avoided.
